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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Appellant Sel va Eugi n McGi ntj , by ai id 
through his attorney, James "Tucker" Hansen, hereby responds to 
tin. Brief of Appel 1 ee, i n regard to the following issues: 
Issue I. Should the trial court's finding chat the 
ranch property was marital property be allowed when the 
evidence shuw1. lh.il the pi opert y was nwiwil Iby the plaintiff 
prior to the marriage? 
Issue II. Did ri> trial court improperly divide the 
ranch proper ty by awar< - * :*, >-.-••.. r-r the 
evidence showed that the plaintiff contributed substantia]1y 
more to paying off the property? 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are set forth on pages 3-7 of 
Plaintiff/Appellant Selva McGinty's appeal brief, and will be 
referenced throughout this reply brief. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant has subdivided her brief into five separate 
subsections, to which plaintiff will respond in order. 
I. PLAINTIFF HAS PROPERLY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE AND HAS 
SHOWN THAT IT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
Defendant is improperly asserting that Plaintiff is 
making a one-sided manipulation of the evidence by not 
marshalling all facts. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987), stated that for a factual resolution to 
be overturned, the appellant must "first marshall all the 
evidence supporting the trial court,s finding and then 
demonstrate that that evidence, when compared to the contrary 
evidence, is so lacking as to warrant the conclusion that clear 
error has been committed." 745 P.2d at 1278 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff has mentioned the relevant facts in regard to the 
case (Brief of Appellant, pp. 3-7), and argues that these facts 
do not support the trial court judgement. 
For example, in appellant's brief, Plaintiff notes in 
Statements of Facts 5, 8, 14, 17, 19, and 20 that Defendant 
2 
advanced iiuncis to either Plaintiff c: L^ uie ranch account at 
various times, (Brief of Appe . - yp. 4-7). Th i s e s ' I dence, 
absent contrary evidence, might be construed tc support the 
^ng that the ranci *• f venture and 
marital property. However, Plai nti trary 
evidence, as required by Newmeyer, which indicates that these 
ddvaiKros u - and were at least partially paid 
back by Plaintiff. Statement of Facts 21 cites trial testimony 
indicating that $'.-.:: * •, $13,638.47 final payment on 
Defendants funds, was repaid 
to Defendant by Plaintiff. (Brief cf *r>pel ] ant p. 7). 
In addition, it should be noted that Plaintiff's 
testimony deninj, U M I tuncis .tdvuitopfi tu h i in by defendant were 
used to make the earnest money payment and down payment on the 
ranch. (TT pp. 24-25). Also, when testifying regarding funds 
transferred iroi 'self to Pl.ii * . - •---*• - ^.-v • *• Dwledged 
that these were "funds that [she] had loaned -nat he had 
advised [her] that he was going fo x^t\ back to [her] " (TT pp. 
178-79), As discussed be] ow In ! < licse transactions 
do not appear to meet the requisite elements to support the 
trial court's finding that a joint venture existed prior to the 
parties marriage. 
" » 3, Defendant is quite subjective in 
l«il»» J i presentations Plaintiff's references to 
3 
testimony, and in discounting evidence that tends to support 
Plaintiff's position. For example, Defendant asserts without 
adequate support that Plaintiff's testimony regarding the final 
payoff on the ranch is "inconsistent," "contradictory and self-
serving," that cross-examination "clearly demonstrated that 
Cotton had no memory of the events surrounding the final payoff 
of the ranch," that "[h]e couldn't remember the payoff amount 
for the ranch, where the money came from, how it got into the 
joint account to make the ranch payment, or how much money, if 
any, had ever been paid back to Lee." (Brief of Appellee, pp. 
16-17). To the contrary, upon direct examination Plaintiff 
recalled that the payoff amount had been "[t]hirteen thousand 
some $600," (TT p. 46), a figure quite close to the $13,638.47 
actual payoff amount. He acknowledged that the majority of the 
payoff amount had come from Defendant's personal funds, but 
recalled that she had been paid back $9,111. (TT p. 46)("On 
one occasion, she took $4,111 and on another occasion there was 
$3,000 and another occasion there was $2,000."). Defendant 
ignores that testimony and asserts that "[a] review of [pages 
46-47] indicates that no such statement [that Cotton paid Lee 
back $9,111.00] was ever made and that Cotton was confused and 
disoriented." (Brief of Appellee, p. 16). 
Defendant has also continually cited to the trial 
court's findings of facts regarding matters which are otherwise 
4 
i Lin Ifar, Do f «• in I. nit n resents these matters to the appellate 
court as il they were established facts. When, as here, the 
findings of fact of the trial court are being appealed, a cite 
I" < the" f i iiiJ i r\<\-\ ill lui'l rat'hf-r than to the record of 
proceedings below can mean no more than a restatement ol how 
? =r - ruled. The reviewing court should look past 
defei* - • r evidence to 
determine the accuracy > inaccuracy o! tiit findings o* -fan.*. 
In that regard, this court should note that portions 
o f ^ t '? i ' i a t • -in* 'Hi u l 1 r-jct c*. rii'i1 i iiiJ I " J i f f i e i e n t r 
supported. For example, in Appellee's brief, Statement Fact 
8 cites on] y the Findings of fact as support for the assertion 
that Defendant provided Appe] lai it: * - i •- i n 
the acquisition of joint venture properties and a retirement 
home, (Brief of Appellee p. 5). Defendant disputes that 
finding, and asserts that funds trans let ICMII ( rum Defendant I'M 
Plaintiff were merely loaned. When testifying regarding funds 
transferred from Plaintiff to Defendant, Plaintiff acknowledged 
that these were "funds that [she] had loaned t", h i in !.hat he had 
advised [her] that he was going to pay back to [her] " (TT pp. 
178-7*Vj a i man ' ;_unds to the Plaintiff does not indicate a 
purchase of an ownership interest i n the ranch. 
Defendant has also faulted Plaintiff for his lack of 
ms that advances made to him 
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by Defendant were loans. However, it should be pointed out 
that Defendant did the bookkeeping for the ranch, and was thus 
more familiar with the financial records. (TT 43, 189). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING THAT THE RANCH WAS A JOINT 
VENTURE AND MARITAL ASSET IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENTLY 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS, NOR BY THE EVIDENCE AS A WHOLE. 
The trial court held that the Ranch was a joint 
venture and a marital asset of Plaintiff and Defendant. (FF 
10). It apparently based this conclusion on some general 
findings: Lee signed and participated in listing agreements for 
sale of portions of the ranch; she provided the funds for half 
of the lump sum payments (the court does not list the evidence 
from which it made this conclusion); the installment payments 
ultimately came from joint funds; she made substantial 
contributions both before and during the marriage by way of 
maintenance, preservation, and protection of the ranch; and, 
she made substantial contributions of her sole and separate 
funds. Plaintiff asserts that the conclusion that the ranch 
was a joint venture and marital asset is not supported by 
sufficiently specific findings, and is not supported by the 
evidence when viewed as a whole. 
The trial court's findings must be "sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached." Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 
6 
1987} "[T]he court's divisi.; - ^he estate c .. 
undisturbed when we -..-.- /<,* .-resent- ; -,th diffident findings 
•- ablished I;. :1 v. Hall, 858 * .. <* ^ *r P . 
(quoting Burt v. Bu-t 799 P ?d 116^. ] ! \ ^ -
elements cf a jvim ventui- jemonstrdif u* . , - ^ *^ 
this - •->t • ^ ^'^nrements for a holdiou that the ranch was 
a 
a _eint venture die: r exist prjoi " * n* rartieb rudrrir. .r, 
Utah law
 v1-^^ n^ *" ^ : ^indi^ th* was 
marital property pr 
Defendant's marriaae o; '• ne 18, 19*"'• etore iajption of 
uLaii UJLU not rec-^ri"^ --i 
unsolemnizcu relatiOiioL^ as a marri^rre. c 
parties may have a- ten i othei respects as spouses.** Wa3 ters 
, a _L t e i - r u " u ,",f N|-'^ -<•- i|j ~+-1 nq" 
Layton v. Layton, ) . 
Section 30-i-4,5 m*:v not be applied retroactively at 68. 
t - iioxaxng tha*~ * ne 
ranch was maritai -t rupeity , . « . . i ^ ..^emnization c *ie 
parties' marriage, defendant is torced t. * ,\ the existence 
tiie ranch 
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prior to the parties' marriage. Regarding a joint venture 
relationship, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
The requirements for the relationship are not 
exactly defined, but certain elements are essential: 
the parties must combine their property, money, 
effects, skill, labor, and knowledge. As a general 
rule, there must be a community of interest in the 
performance of the common purpose, a joint 
proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual 
right to control, a right to share in the profits, 
and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a 
duty to share in any losses which may be sustained. 
Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974)). 
Plaintiff asserts that when both supporting and 
contrary evidence is considered, the essential elements of a 
joint venture in the ranch did not exist prior to Plaintiff and 
Defendant's marriage. As discussed in section 1, the evidence 
indicates that fund advances from Defendant to Plaintiff were 
loans, which were at least partially repaid. Lee acknowledged 
that funds advanced to Cotton were loans, which she was told 
would be repaid. Plaintiff claimed the ranch as solely his on 
his tax returns prior to the marriage. (TT pp. 43-44). 
Plaintiff had been involved in land purchases in the Moab area 
since 1954 (TT p. 17), several years before he met Defendant 
(TT p. 18). The McGinty ranch was purchased by Plaintiff alone 
(TT p. 20), and was paid for by him out of his separate funds 
(TT pp. 24-25). Plaintiff listed several assets he owned prior 
8 
.v ^
 n h e s o l d f o r t h e p U rp O S e Of 
paying the init^c,
 r .^ ,.., . . ,t<= on the ranch out of his 
OWTl funds. (TT ; 2 7 -29). 
* > -* mi ist 
conclude thai -~ . * ventuit cuu. - , .4oxi existed . d^een 
the parties pr i • * * h« -
 marn Defendant merely made 
11 i i 11 : 
Defendant's, were MM-I| In make the initial payment- <.. ..ie 
ranch purchase.. Defendant had no proprietary i nterest 
IBO: id i i :: • si iaii : = r 
ses. 
T h e r e f o r e a t the t:i iii =s t h e p a r t i e s were 'mar r i ed , t h e 
ranch was a separ a t e a s s i / l Il I lllii1 II"hi i s 
e a r n i n g s , oi i t of which p u r c h a s e p r i c e -st ^ n t n i s were p a i d 
b e f o r e ai I I dur ing t h e marri age ( s e e T>r-ef of Aroel ^r j , 
were a t t r i b u t a b l e to h i m. Lee can ^ . i ^ m no i:.__..._ ; 
ranch due t o p u r c h a s e i n s t a l l m e n t s p a i d out * i r a n c h income. 
11 i P r e s t o i i v P r e s t o n , 646 r . ^ u / U J '* * * o-p \ *- K
 e ^tah 
Supreme C o u r t rev iewea . , J v o r c e ca . . i i a »urt 
had d e c r e e d t h a t each p a r t y shou ld r e c e i v e * *io s e p a r a t e 
ptopi ' i t1* III Mm11|in! • - - r d a - • * n Utah l a w . 
Unck i tli.it. d e c r e e , Lhe Supreme ^ U n , ^ u ; . .w T*Tas e r r o r f o r 
t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o award t h e w i l e a s h a r e of p r o p e r t y p u r c h a s e d 
W I I III | i I ' m ' H t M i j I 1 i mi in in 5 S * *. - ' d 
III 
prior to marriage. It was required that the decree be modified 
so that the husband would be given credit for his separate 
property contribution, as well as the proportion of 
appreciation in value attributable thereto. Id., at 706. 
Likewise, when as here Plaintiff individually entered a 
contract for purchase of the ranch several years prior to his 
marriage to Defendant and paid the initial purchase 
installments out of his separate funds, Defendant is not 
entitled to any ownership interest for payments made on the 
ranch out of ranch income. The only payments Defendant can 
show that she made toward the purchase of the ranch were a few 
miscellaneous transfers from her separate assets to the ranch 
account during marriage, and the portion of the final payoff 
that was not repaid to her from Plaintiff. It was error for 
the trial court to hold that Defendant is entitled to a one-
half interest in the ranch. 
In Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the 
court noted that the trial court should "first properly 
categorize the parties property as part of the marital estate 
or as the separate property of one or the other. Each party is 
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property 
and fifty percent of the marital property." Id. at 1022 
(quoting Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990). 
Premarital property is viewed as separate property, and 
10 
tito separate 
property . * ucri* : ' i.t mai ri, -n v . Watson, o.l < I , . il 
•
 r
*- - Apr ause a joint venture could not have 
existed was 
Plaintiff's separate propeit> he s;^...^ , d a i n upon 
divorce 0,if f i^i'™*" bindings h-ive not hee1 naa^ r demonstrate 
why h.. . . separ a; . . ; - o 
Defendant. 
•piie t^r>+. ;^^„, 4 , ,., n^rt:oc indicates that they 
were conscious . . - • assets, 
Plaintiff testified that during the marnaqe consideration was 
cgi ve ' :i'b ia ^^,- ».* ^ P^ty, but that 
action w i^  ae^xu^v.* gainst. ( . in !"i Ill, 
during the marriage, Defendant removed Plaintiff as her 
i nxiu with her b r o t h ^ >• i 
sister, because sht : Cii tiici 1+" was my business, y 
money." 'TT : . *efend, is well as Plaintiff, 
<~parciLe premarita. arsrts, 
error *. *..*.: . a:n; _:: .; separate proper^ ^  : , t 
into the marriaae :--. marital property. 
* * .ope 1 IanL- s 
Brief as Addendum } * showb thai ilk- partita dua^iags in real 
estate before carriage were more fcrma ! f* •• a i*- facto joint 
VT : - . ! ; 
11 
in the Miller Property, it was done unequivocally, in writing. 
When the parties became joint owners of real estate, they were 
clear about it. This supports Plaintiff's testimony that he 
made a conscious decision not to own the ranch jointly with 
Defendant. The trial court's holding that the ranch was a 
joint venture and marital property is not supported by 
sufficiently detailed reasoning, nor by the evidence as a 
whole. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION SHOULD BE 
OVERTURNED AS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Numerous cases stand for the principle that a 
property division that is clearly erroneous should be modified. 
E.g., Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Holm v. 
Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992); Munns v. Munns, 790 
P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990). Likewise here, where no joint 
venture could have existed prior to the parties marriage, and 
any contributions Defendant made toward payments on the 
property during the marriage were minor, awarding each party 
half of the ranch is clear error. This court should hold that 
the ranch is Plaintiff's separate property, or in the 
alternative, hold that Defendant is entitled to only a 
proportionate ownership which corresponds to her contributions 
to the property. 
VI. CASE LAW SUPPORTS A PRO-RATA DISTRIBUTION OP PROPERTY IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES. 
12 
P l a i n t i f f ~ :~ser t r >-^r>,v* .. ^
 ? s e p a r a t e 
p r o p e r t y , a ^ d a s su c ~ , ., 
e v e n t t h a t t h e cour- iu ; :ds t h a i . p o r t i o n * r.ne ranc : . was 
I Hir i linsoi I :• • ~~~* , ^ ,-, . - * ^ r- - a n c h w a c 
p u r c h a s e d w 
property ; proportion \. - -.he contributions, made o\ each party. 
There is considerable case support for non-equal 
division of marital property <*i - - .* i^ equitable and justified 
wmu> c . , i^ ewrneye. . " 
iz//-/o ii'Un ivb/; >., ricman v. Workman, »' ' p
 w^ .^ 
(TTtah l^?^r navis_v._Dav! - * > (Utah 1982); 
Halx *~,~^±. 
Burt, 799 P.2Q I lot i Uuaii : \'\
 t\^ »v ii'c i.uui t does 
have a limited nowe • iepart from the general v -^ es that each 
party getL .. .
 fc , 
that marital property is divided evenJ>* 
-n^ ^
 r.^ n.-i • *..-,t "lar1'*^ 1 Tropert" because it w-^  
owne 
i mi. 1 - * etwer'i Piaintift and befenda - c. n i. riave 
existed. Althoug5 *ien warranted by the circumstances, the 
court has power t. aepart from the genetai tiih '"I" rl I i in. h, 
as separate property, should go ::./. -he plaintirt, awarding half 
I M in i Ill I Defendant •- ~ • justifiable. As explained in 
pages 11-13 of Appellant's brief, at most Defendant should get 
a 21 percent interest in the ranch. 
Defendant's claims on pages 31-32 of Appellee's 
brief, that she contributed more toward the purchase of the 
ranch than did Plaintiff, cannot be accepted. Though she 
asserts that an examination of the trial transcript provides 
"undisputed evidence" of seven conclusions that indicate she 
had more of an interest in the ranch than did Plaintiff, most 
of those conclusions are the subject of dispute herein. First, 
Plaintiff testified that he made the original $10,000 payment 
out of his own funds, not funds advanced by Defendant. (TT, 
page 24) Second, he also asserts that Defendant had no 
ownership interest in, and was not entitled to any ranch 
income. Third, Defendant asserts in her brief that she 
transferred amounts of $1,500.25 and $1,800.00 to plaintiff 
right before the second annual payment was due. However, 
Plaintiff's exhibit 1 shows that the $20,3 00.00 second 
installment was due on June 1, 1971, and was paid on May 28, 
1971. (Addendum H to Brief of Appellant) Defendant's exhibit 
27 shows that the $1,800.00 check was written on June 8, 1971, 
and the $1,500.25 check was written on March 24, 1972, both 
after Plaintiff had already made the second installment. 
(Addendum I to Appellant's Brief) Fourth, Plaintiff asserts 
that much of the final payoff, paid from Defendant's funds, was 
14 
a sound lega r,,r :s separ,*< * urn proviued the nitai 
>ui.cliasp price. In ~ h* P ent 
the ranch - ^ d* uaej :. ^ . nnp_. a 
*-^ n,-h should be awarder :. . . : * .. oorrecponc * ":-=- greater 
- . v., ~v-;,,,-,-i , ,- K- s funds 
Plaintiff r\3s i JubUateu - , ,^„
 A .,,,_ . . .». 
contribution? i-^ vai i the ranch purchase m«- at inc. t 
perct, * ' * * arrw * not 
awarded Flamtii : tree oL Delenaaui ^ . ^ H L u»na^ :r. 
should equitablw hf ^ppor^ionod onlv 2. percent r*nership 
the rancn, wii. * naxnxriy /^  
percent. 
DEFENDANT ™^ULD NOT BE AWARDED RULE n SANCTIONS. 
Del en J^ ... *.:.^. ^  ^ *- j ) 
damages under Rule 3J ot the* I'tdh I^ uiei- ^L Appellate Procedure 
property divisio- the divoice decree • - • ,-t,rt should 
i * f i r ^  ~^'i *"K^ w -*Tn*"'s -•*^  ^ r d e » .ri, rit 1 1
 f 
t i l t : d l L e i f i d t JL V e , u * . . * w . u . * „ ' . •. • 
according to their respective contributions toward the purchase 
prn.'f.'f » • ') '. 
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A frivolous appeal is "[o]ne in which no justiciable 
question has been presented and . . . is readily recognizable 
as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can 
ever succeed." Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 169 (Utah App. 
1992) (quoting Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990)). 
Because this appeal is meritorious, the decree should be 
modified, and no basis for sanctions under Rule 33 exists. See 
Holm, at 169; Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah App. 
1990). 
Only extremely egregious appeals are subject to 
sanctions. "[S]anctions for filing frivolous appeals are 
'applied only in egregious cases, lest there be an improper 
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court 
decisions. ,lf Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah App. 
1992) (quoting Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 
1989)) (holding that although appellant's arguments were based 
on a strained reading of the probate code, this was not an 
egregious case where all counsel would recognize that arguments 
made on appeal are without merit). C.f. Call v. City of West 
Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049 (Utah App. 1990) ("Although bordering 
perilously close to being frivolous, we do not find the issues 
brought in this appeal to be so because of the confusion 
engendered by the previous litigation."); Munns, 790 P.2d at 
123 ("With respect to the issues upon which respondent 
16 
* * *., ' successful arv* v b ^ h ^ • *-+^- of 
consideration n, not an egre^„.. . \ 
therefore, is .s t t : **o: J ^ son v. Wasatch Manor, 
*_*vv^_
 VULCIII **pp- -L^^VJ ^a,+,^,v,,h decision 
affirmed, appel. , > ...i^ or appeal -^r<=> nr iut a 
reasonable legal an: factual basis, :;anrtior - z applied). 
appellant 
would be subject i^ banctioi^ uiiJer ^ ^ J, 
ELUSION 
Base in 
Appellant's brier, rldintiii requests that uiu& .....LI ix.ua that 
the ranch was *"h<=> ? ^ inriff's separate property and that it be 
Defendant. i** * :.* :cr-\:* , .*• 4 :amLi:: requests that tho 
court ma1'" =*r ^T!'4, »h,o determination ?rr />*- h«- i:o ^ata 
contribution ,, s 
property division r--.; that Plaint lft receives approximately 79 
percent 01 uie piroceeds from, the sale of the ranch and that 
Defendant receive ," " pr''t eenl . 
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